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This paper estimates an education production function using data on the College Scholastic
Ability Test (CSAT) score and high school characteristics from Seoul, Korea.1 A unique insti-
tutional feature of the high school system in Seoul is that on entering high school students are
randomly assigned to schools within each school district. The main contribution of our study is
to derive a school production function by aggregating the individuals’ potential outcome functions
that depend on observed and unobserved school inputs interacted with heterogeneous and unob-
served individual abilities. The school production function derived under random assignment and
under the assumption that there are no cohort effects has three unique features that have not been
considered in previous studies. First, its coefficients on school inputs do not differ by school or
over time, but by district. This is a consequence of the endogenous sorting of students between
districts2 combined with the random assignment to schools within districts. Second, it allows
unobserved school effects to be potentially correlated with observed ones. Third, the weighted
average of the district-specific school input effects with weights equal to the fraction of the pop-
ulation in the districts is equal to the average partial effect (APE) of school inputs on individual
academic achievement. To estimate the school production function coefficients, we first obtain
district-specific coefficients using the fixed effect estimation method in school level panel data for
each district and compute the weighted average described above. The empirical findings are (i)
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the school production function coefficients do differ between districts, which may be due to poten-
tially endogenous sorting of students or unobserved differences in district characteristics, (ii) our
estimate of the single-sex school effect is much larger than that found in previous studies most of
which assumed constant school input coefficients across districts and did not consider school fixed
effects.
I. Background and Data
The education policy in Korea over the past four decades greatly emphasized equal educational
opportunity. In accordance with the policy emphasis, the High School Equalization Policy (HSEP)
was adopted in Seoul in 1974. The HSEP aimed to provide students with a uniform learning envi-
ronment and to close the achievement gap across schools by minimizing across-school variation in
student quality, teacher quality, and school facilities and curriculum.34 Under the HSEP, students
were randomly assigned to academic high schools within school districts where they met residency
requirements.5 The random assignment made the distribution of student ability similar among the
schools within a district. Thus, students living in the same district had similar peers. When stu-
dents and their families moved to another school district, the students were reassigned randomly
to a school in the new district.
There are 55 coed, 34 all-girls, and 38 all-boys high schools, which are either public or private,
in our data.6 Until choice-based assignment was introduced in 2010, academic high schools were
subject to the lottery-based assignment regardless of their type – coed vs. single-sex or public
vs. private. Unlike in the US and many other countries, private academic high schools were not
3The strong emphasis on equal treatment in education policy has been maintained until 2009. The policy focus has
shifted from uniformity to diversity afterward. Policymakers started to encourage competition among schools in 2010.
4For more information on the HSEP and its impacts, see, for example, Kang, Park and Lee (2007); Kim, Lee and
Lee (2008); Lee (2012).
5The student assignment lottery covered academic high schools in ten school districts, including Districts 1-4, 6-11.
High schools excluded from the random assignment were vocational high schools; selective high schools specialized
in science, foreign languages, art, or physical education; and academic high schools near the city center – mostly in
District 5 and some in Districts 1, 2, 10, and 11.
6Single-sex schools tend to be older and are more likely to be private. This is partly because in the past high schools
started as single-sex schools. The government has increased the number of coed schools by requiring since 1998 that
all newly-opened public schools are coed.
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much different from public academic high schools in educational environment, school curriculum,
government subsidy, teacher quality, and even school tuition.
We use data on the CSAT scores and high school characteristics obtained from the Korean
Ministry of Education and Korea Education and Research Information Service (KERIS). We link
the individual level test score data and the high school characteristics using school names.7 The
CSAT is the standardized test for college admissions in Korea. This test is developed, published,
administered, and scored by the Korean government. The CSAT score on Korean is the main
educational outcome in this study.8 The scores were standardized to have a mean of 100 points
and a standard deviation of 20 points. The test is offered once a year in November and is taken by
about 600,000 individuals including high school seniors, high school graduates, and GED holders.
The CSAT scores together with the high school GPA are the most important factors that determine,
whether a student is admitted to some college and to which college.
We restrict our analysis to high school seniors in 2008 and 2009,9 who were randomly as-
signed to academic high schools within school districts 3, 4, 6-9 of Seoul. All academic high
schools within each of the six districts participated in the lottery-based student assignment. For
the 2008 and 2009 cohorts of seniors, the assignment was conducted in February 2006 and 2007,
respectively.10 The analysis sample covers about 60 percent of CSAT takers in Seoul – 50,809
students in 2008 and 58,905 in 2009. Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of school level
variables that are included in our empirical specifications. We focus on boys here and numbers for
girls are shown in the appendix.
7Our data cover the entire population of CSAT takers and high schools in Korea, but contain no individual charac-
teristics other than gender, whether the person is a high school student, and which high school the person attends.
8The CSAT consists of five major sections: Korean, Math, English, Sciences/Social Studies/Vocational Education,
and Second Foreign Languages. The results for English and Math scores are not much different from the results for
Korean scores.
9School characteristics are available from 2008 and the HSEP was effectively abolished in 2010.
10The school year begins in early March and ends in mid-February in Korea.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Boys
District 3 District 4 District 6 District 7 District 8 District 9
Average Korean CSAT score 91.9 97.6 98.2 98.4 102.8 94.2
[3.7] [3.3] [2.1] [4.7] [3.1] [2.4]
Percentage of single-sex schools 28.6 35.3 35.7 52.9 47.4 41.7
Percentage of private schools 21.4 41.2 57.1 70.6 52.6 50.0
Age of school in 2008 (in years) 25.1 19.1 42.1 27.9 40.0 32.4
[14.5] [19.0] [35.5] [23.6] [28.4] [15.8]
Class size for seniors 35.9 35.0 36.3 35.1 34.3 34.7
[2.4] [1.9] [2.7] [2.6] [2.5] [2.2]
Percentage of students receiving 10.5 7.1 5.7 7.6 3.9 11.6
lunch support [4.7] [3.9] [2.2] [4.4] [2.9] [3.1]
Annual development fund spending 30.6 26.1 48.5 31.2 94.9 48.2
per student (in 1000 KRW) [24.8] [39.3] [54.0] [26.6] [96.6] [60.9]
Percentage of female teachers 49.7 44.6 37.5 31.2 39.1 38.8
[18.0] [13.3] [17.0] [19.4] [19.4] [23.0]
Number of male seniors 297.6 316.7 417.2 347.4 344.7 282.8
per school [114.9] [175.9] [143.0] [156.8] [153.5] [140.9]
Number of male CSAT takers 267.6 297.2 380.0 326.0 314.2 257.6
per school [101.3] [170.1] [130.3] [152.2] [138.4] [130.7]
Number of high schools 14 17 14 17 19 12
Notes: All variables are for the school level. Standard deviations in brackets. 1000 KRW is worth approximately
1 USD.
II. Econometric Framework
A. The Individual Potential Outcome
We consider the following potential outcome of individual i ∈ I at school s(d) ∈Sd of district
d ∈ D in year t ∈ T . We assume a linear education production function with heterogeneous
coefficients:
Yi (s(d) ,d, t) =K′s(d)α i+L
′
s(d),tβ i+ vs(d)ωi+us(d),tξi+ cdηi. (1)
The (potential) outcome Yi(s(d) ,d, t) is the (potential) CSAT score of student i if he attends school
s(d) of district d in year t. The variables Ks(d) and Ls(d),t denote time-invariant and time-varying
school inputs, respectively. The variables vs(d) and us(d),t , respectively, represent the unobserved
time-invariant school inputs and unobserved time-varying school inputs. The variable cd repre-
sents (unobserved) district characteristics. The coefficients (α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi) represent heteroge-
neous individual responses to the school inputs (observed and unobserved) and the unobserved
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district characteristics. The specification of the potential outcome model for Yi(s(d) ,d, t) assumes





(observed and unobserved) and the individual
(heterogeneous) coefficients (α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi).11
Suppose that Si denotes the school that individual i attends, Ti denotes the senior year of in-
dividual i, and Di is the district where individual i chose to live. The observed outcome, i.e. the
CSAT score, of individual i is
Yi = Yi (Si,Di,Ti) .






The parameters of interest are the APE of the school inputs of interest, Ks(d) and Ls(d),t :
α = E [α i] and β = E [β i] .
B. School Production Function
The school production function is the aggregate of the individual outcome functions and depends
on the school level inputs. The aggregation is done under the following two key assumptions.
Assumption 1 [Random Assignment Within District] We assume that for all (s(d) ,d, t) ,
E [(α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi) | Si = s(d) ,Di = d,Ti = t] = E [(α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi) | Di = d,Ti = t] .
Assumption 2 [No Cohort Effect] We assume that for all t,
E [(α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi) | Di = d,Ti = t] = E [(α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi) | Di = d] .
11In the potential outcome function (1), we do not include a time effect because the CSAT scores are normalized.
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Assumption 1 follows from the random assignment of students within school districts. As-
sumption 2 assumes that the district average of student abilities does not change over time. This
assumption is justified if the distribution of student abilities and the district choice selection does
not change across cohorts. Given that our data covers two consecutive years, Assumption 2 is
reasonable.
The average input effects for students in district d are denoted by
(αd,β d,ωd,ξd,ηd) = E [(α i,β i,ωi,ξi,ηi) |Di = d] .
If the individual district choice is independent of the individual input effect, then α = αd and
β = β d . In the case we study, however, the average productivity of school inputs may differ by
school district because students were likely to be sorted endogenously across districts. By allowing
the average productivity to differ between districts, we explicitly take into account the potentially
endogenous district selection.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the expected test score of individual i attending school s in district
d in year t is that
E [Yi|Si = s(d) ,Di = d,Ti = t]
= E [Yi (s(d) ,d, t) |Si = s(d) ,Di = d,Ti = t]
= K′s(d)αd+L
′
s(d),tβ d+ vs(d)ωd+us(d),tξd+ cdηd.
For notational convenience, we will also use the simplified subscripts Ys,d,t = Ys(d),t , Ks,d =Ks(d),
Ls,d,t = Ls(d),t , Vs,d = vs(d)ωd , Us,d,t = us(d),tξd , and Cd = cdηd. Then, we can write the average
outcome of school s in district d and year t as a function of school inputs and district characteristics:
E [Yi|Si = s(d) ,Di = d,Ti = t] =K′s,dαd+L′s,d,tβ d+Vs,d+Us,d,t+Cd,
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Suppose that Ys,d,t is the aggregated test score of school s in district d in year t,
Ys,d,t =
∑Ni=1YiI{Si = s(d) ,Di = d,Ti = t}





s,d,tβ d+Vs,d+Us,d,t+Cd+Es,d,t , (2)
where Es,d,t is the aggregate error, and this yields the school production function.
Note that we derive the school production function by aggregating the individual outcomes.
This procedure is similar to the derivation of the market demand function as an aggregation over
individual choices (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)). The school production function (2) has
the unique feature that the coefficients αd and β d of the observed school inputs are district specific,
but constant across schools within each district and over time. The random assignment of students
within districts and the assumption of no cohort effects are key for the constant productivity of
school inputs within a district. Notice that if there is no individual heterogeneity in the potential
outcome, which is a very strong restriction, it follows that αd = α and β d = β . Under self-
selection of schools and individual heterogeneity, the school production function is a correlated




using school level data becomes challenging. In our setup, district specific coefficients (αd,β d)
are district averages of (α i,β i).
C. Estimation of α and β



















. The usual identification assumptions imply strict exogeneity of Ls,d,t with
respect to time-varying unobserved school effects, Us,d,t , and exogeneity of Ks,d with respect not
only to the time average of Us,d,t but also to Vs,d.
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The APE parameters of interests are
α = E[α i] = E [E [α i|Di = d]] = ∑
d∈D
αdP [Di = d] and
β = E[β i] = E [E [β i|Di = d]] = ∑
d∈D
β dP [Di = d] .













where Nd is the number of students in district d and N is the total number of students in Seoul.
In view that the school production function (2) takes a panel linear regression form within each


















































where NS(d) is the number of schools in district d.
III. Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents the estimated school input effects, especially the effect of single-sex education
and class size for boys.12 Regressions also include other time-varying and time-invariant covari-
12Results for girls are in the appendix.
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Table 2: School Input Effects on Korean CSAT Scores for Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
District 3 District 4 District 6 District 7 District 8 District 9 APE
Single-sex 9.78 0.89 1.28 8.46 5.15 2.49 4.64
(2.31)*** (1.77) (0.99) (3.02)** (1.45)*** (2.05) (0.84)***
Class size for seniors -0.46 -0.13 -0.34 0.11 -0.25 -0.01 -0.18
(0.41) (0.11) (0.11)*** (0.19) (0.13)* (0.24) (0.08)**
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered in school level for coefficients on time-varying regressors.
Time-varying control variables include the fraction of students receiving free or reduced price lunch, annual
development fund spending per student, and the fraction of female teachers. Time-invariant control variables
include a private indicator, age of the school in 2008, and the interaction between the two.
ates that serve as control variables and are possibly correlated with unobserved school characteris-
tics. Time-varying controls include the fraction of students receiving free or reduced price lunch,
annual development fund spending per student, and the fraction of female teachers. Time-invariant
controls include a private school indicator, age of the school in 2008, and the interaction between
the two.
From columns (1)-(6), we observe that single-sex education effects vary substantially across
school districts from no effect in District 4 to a positive effect as large as half a standard deviation
in District 3. The class size effect is near zero (or insignificant) and negative in all districts but
District 7. The heterogeneous effects imply that endogenous sorting of individuals across districts
may play an important role. To understand the mechanism of sorting, we would need more infor-
mation on individual characteristics from which we could infer how school characteristics interact
with individual preference and productivity. The estimated APE of school inputs are shown in
column (7). We use the number of CSAT takers in each district to construct the weighted aver-
age.13 Compared to Park, Behrman and Choi (2013) who used the same data but a different model
specification,14 our APE estimates are qualitatively similar but quantitatively different – the effect
of single-sex education is much larger.
Our findings suggest that it is important to take district heterogeneity due to sorting between
13 The APE estimates change little when we use the number of seniors or the cohort size at random assignment as
weights.
14They assume that school and district effects are random effects and that school input effects are constant across
schools and districts.
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districts and unobserved school characteristics into account when estimating the average effect of
school inputs on test score.
References
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Joshua Angrist, and Parag Pathak. 2014. “The Elite Illusion: Achieve-
ment Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools.” Econometrica, 82(1): 137–196.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Victor Lavy. 1999. “Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate the Effect
of Class Size on Scholastic Achievement.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2): pp.
533–575.
Bayer, Patrick, Fernando Ferreira, and Robert McMillan. 2007. “A Unified Framework
for Measuring Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods.” Journal of Political Economy,
115(4): pp. 588–638.
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. 1995. “Automobile Prices in Market Equilib-
rium.” Econometrica, 63(4): pp. 841–890.
Dearden, Lorraine, Javier Ferri, and Costas Meghir. 2002. “The Effect of School Quality on
Educational Attainment and Wages.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1): pp. 1–20.
Kang, Changhui, Cheolsung Park, and Myoung-Jae Lee. 2007. “Effects of ability mixing in
high school on adulthood earnings: quasiexperimental evidence from South Korea.” Journal of
Population Economics, 20: 269–297.
Kim, Taejong, Ju-Ho Lee, and Young Lee. 2008. “Mixing versus sorting in schooling: Evidence
from the equalization policy in South Korea.” Economics of Education Review, 27(6): 697 –
711.
Krueger, Alan B. 1999. “Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions.” The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 114(2): pp. 497–532.
Lee, Yong Suk. 2012. “Educational Tracking, Residential Sorting, and Intergenerational Mobility.”
Working Paper, Williams College.
Meghir, Costas, and Steven Rivkin. 2011. “Econometric Methods for Research in Education.” In
Handbook of the Economics of Education. Vol. 3, , ed. Stephen Machin Eric A. Hanushek and
Ludger Woessmann, Chapter 1, 1 – 87. Elsevier.
Park, Hyunjoon, Jere R. Behrman, and Jaesung Choi. 2013. “Causal Effects of Single-Sex
Schools on College Entrance Exams and College Attendance: Random Assignment in Seoul
High Schools.” Demography, 50(2): 447–469.
Rivkin, Steven G., Eric A. Hanushek, and John F. Kain. 2005. “Teachers, Schools, and Aca-
demic Achievement.” Econometrica, 73(2): 417–458.
10
Rothstein, Jesse M. 2006. “Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Char-
acteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition among Jurisdictions.”
American Economic Review, 96(4): 1333–1350.
Urquiola, Miguel. 2005. “Does School Choice Lead to Sorting? Evidence from Tiebout Varia-
tion.” American Economic Review, 95(4): 1310–1326.
11
Appendix
Appendix Table1: Summary Statistics for Girls
District 3 District 4 District 6 District 7 District 8 District 9
Average Korean CSAT score 97.9 102.8 103.0 103.0 106.8 100.2
[3.7] [3.2] [2.4] [4.3] [3.1] [2.7]
Percentage of single-sex schools 28.6 35.3 40.0 46.7 41.2 36.4
Percentage of private schools 14.3 47.1 53.3 60.0 52.9 45.5
Age of school in 2008 (in years) 23.3 16.4 35.5 24.1 44.1 35.7
[16.0] [17.2] [30.1] [23.6] [30.4] [27.0]
Class size for seniors 36.1 35.1 36.5 35.6 34.8 34.8
[2.3] [1.8] [2.9] [2.8] [2.9] [2.6]
Percentage of students receiving 10.4 7.8 6.0 9.1 4.2 12.0
lunch support [4.7] [3.6] [2.8] [4.6] [3.2] [2.6]
Annual development fund spending 40.7 17.2 27.2 20.5 54.5 35.5
per student (in 1000 KRW) [96.7] [19.9] [33.5] [14.1] [60.6] [27.3]
Percentage of female teachers 60.6 53.3 47.0 53.0 53.4 52.7
[7.7] [5.6] [15.7] [8.8] [12.2] [16.5]
Number of female seniors 255.6 299.1 361.4 346.5 334.3 258.4
per school [114.1] [168.0] [185.5] [186.6] [158.8] [91.6]
Number of female CSAT takers 236.9 286.4 339.6 330.5 307.6 242.6
per school [108.6] [165.6] [177.2] [180.3] [145.3] [88.3]
Number of high schools 14 17 15 15 17 11
Notes: All variables are for the school level. Standard deviations in brackets. 1000 KRW is worth approximately
1 USD.
Appendix Table 2: School Input Effects on Korean CSAT Scores for Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
District 3 District 4 District 6 District 7 District 8 District 9 APE
Single-sex 2.98 6.62 0.01 -2.98 2.51 1.18 1.67
(4.88) (1.78)*** (1.80) (2.81) (4.16) (2.25) (1.28)
Class size for seniors -0.24 -0.09 0.11 -0.08 -0.18 -0.03 -0.08
(0.27) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07)
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered in school level for coefficients on time-varying regressors.
Time-varying control variables include the fraction of students receiving free or reduced price lunch, annual
development fund spending per student, and the fraction of female teachers. Time-invariant control variables
include a private indicator, age of the school in 2008, and the interaction between the two.
